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The Perpetual “Invasion”: Past as 
Prologue in Constitutional 
Immigration Law 
 
Matthew J. Lindsay* 
 
Donald Trump ascended to the presidency largely on the 
promise to protect the American people—their physical and 
financial security, their culture and language, even the integrity of 
their electoral system—against an invading foreign menace.1 Only 
extraordinary defensive measures, including “extreme vetting” of 
would-be immigrants, a ban on Muslims entering the United 
States, and a 2,000-mile-long wall along the nation’s southern 
border could repel the encroaching hordes.2 If candidate Trump’s 
scapegoating of unauthorized migrants and refugees was 
disarmingly effective, it was also eerily familiar to those of us who 
study the history of immigration law and policy. Indeed, the trope 
of an immigrant “invasion” has long been a rhetorical mainstay of 
American political discourse. Much less well understood, however, 
is the extent to which the invasion trope has also shaped the federal 
government’s vast, extra-constitutional, and largely unrestrained 
authority to exclude or expel noncitizens from the United States. 
This Article describes the origin of that authority in the 
nativist movements of the late-nineteenth century, including both 
 
* Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. For their 
valuable insight and criticism, I am grateful to Kim Reilly, and to the 
participants in the DePaul College of Law Faculty Seminar. 
1. See, e.g., Max Fisher & Amanda Taub, How Donald Trump Hacked the
 Politics of Foreign Policy, N.Y. TIMES    (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/world/americas/donald-trump-foreign- 
policy.html. 
2. See infra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
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the virulent anti-Chinese crusade that culminated in the Chinese 
Exclusion Act, and the decades-long and ultimately successful 
campaign to severely curtail the immigration of “new” Europeans 
from Southern and Eastern Europe. The legacy of this history 
endures to the present, as the Supreme Court continues to account 
for its broad deference to the political branches on immigration 
matters in terms of an inextricable connection between 
immigration regulation and the conduct of national security. This 
Article concludes by considering whether President Trump’s 
unusually candid (unusual, at least, during the last half-century) 
deployment of the invasion trope might have an edifying effect on 
the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii, the travel ban case, as the 
justices contemplate the implications of deferring to a President 
whose campaign-season political demagoguery has now mutated to 
official United States policy. 
* * * * * 
In March of 1882, United States Senator John P. Jones of 
Nevada sought to correct a dangerous misapprehension about the 
nation’s founding principles.3 The authors of the Declaration of 
Independence, he instructed, had never “intended to say that all 
men of all races were equal.”4 Rather, “free institutions [were] a 
monopoly of the favored races,” and none but the “Caucasian race” 
had proved “capable of treading freedom’s heights with firm and 
unwavering step.”5 Congress adopted the legislation championed 
by Senator Jones, the Chinese Exclusion Act, by overwhelming 
majorities in both houses.6 Less than three years later, however, 
the Caucasian race’s steady march toward “freedom’s heights” 
appeared to stall, and Congress was again called upon to secure the 
nation against foreign degradation. It was pure folly to believe 
“that our advanced and vigorous race [cannot] be . . . deteriorated 
by coming in contact with other races or people,” declared 
Representative Martin Foran.7 Unless lawmakers took swift 
action, a U.S. Senator agreed, “within a brief space dangers as great 
as those that have overthrown monarchs and despots may with 
 
3. 13 CONG. REC. 1740 (1882). 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1742. 
6. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58. 
7. 15 CONG. REC. 5351 (1884). 
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ruthless rage assail the institutions of republican freedom.”8 This 
time, however, it was not the “little brown man,”9 but rather legions 
of European “pauper laborers” descending upon the nation’s cities 
and factories that impelled Congress to “consider whether it may 
not be patriotic and prudent . . . to modify existing views as to the 
Declaration of Independence and the universal rights of man.”10 
Congress again obliged, and passed the Contract Labor Act of 1885, 
prohibiting the admission of European migrants who had embarked 
for the United States after having entered into a labor contract with 
an American employer.11 
Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court bolstered the restrictionist 
program by endowing Congress and the Executive with a vast, 
extra-constitutional authority to exclude or expel noncitizens from 
the United States. As Justice Stephen Field wrote for a unanimous 
Court in the 1889 Chinese Exclusion Case, if the nation was to 
“preserve its independence, and give security against foreign 
aggression and encroachment” from the “vast hordes” of 
unassimilable laborers “crowding in upon us,”12 it was essential 
that federal policymakers be clothed with a plenary authority that 
was beyond the reach of judicially enforceable constitutional 
constraints. Field famously dwelled on Chinese immigrants’ social 
insularity and uncivilized, servile habits of life and labor.13 They 
“remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and 
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country,”14 Field 
complained—a failure to assimilate that he attributed to 
intractable “differences of race.”15 
For Justice Field, as for many late-nineteenth-century jurists 
and statesmen, the effects of cheap, servile Chinese labor on 
American workers was less a commercial problem than one of 
national security—of defending the nation against what he called 
the “Oriental invasion.”16 “[I]f . . . the government of the United 
 
8. 16 CONG. REC. 1624 (1885). 
9. 13 CONG. REC. 1743 (1882). 
10. 16 CONG. REC. 1624 (1885). 
11. Contract Labor Act of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332. 
12. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
13. See id. at 595. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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States . . . considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in 
this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its 
peace and security,”17 he declared, “their exclusion is not to be 
stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the 
nation of which the foreigners are subjects.”18 Such a policy, 
moreover, was “conclusive upon the judiciary.”19 Although this 
wholesale reorganization of federal authority marked a radical 
break with historical practice, the Court portrayed the new regime 
as a natural concomitant of sovereign nationhood grounded in 
timeless principles of international law.20 Three years later, the 
Court confirmed that this novel, extra-constitutional federal 
immigration power extended beyond the exigencies of Chinese 
exclusion, to the nation’s general immigration laws.21 In holding 
that a federal immigration inspector’s decision to deny admission 
to a Japanese woman was not reviewable in federal court, the Court 
set out the formulation of federal authority that would become the 
primary rhetorical touchstone for subsequent immigration cases: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every 
sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, 
and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of 
foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in 
such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to 
prescribe. In the United States this power is vested in the 
national government, to which the Constitution has 
committed the entire control of international relations, in 
peace as well as in war.22 
As a question of national sovereignty, the Court reasoned, the 
 
17. Id. at 606. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. See id. at 604. 
21. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). 
22. Id. (internal citations omitted). Federal immigration officials had 
denied entry to Nishimura Ekiu under a provision of the Immigration Act of 
1891 excluding from the United States “persons likely to become a public 
charge.” Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. The 1891 Act 
had further assigned exclusive authority to administer the immigration laws, 
including the inspection of immigrants, to a national Superintendent of 
Immigration lodged within the U.S. Treasury Department, and made final the 
decisions of federal inspection officers “touching the right of any alien to land,” 
subject to review only by the Superintendent and Treasury Secretary. Id. §§ 7– 
8. 
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decision to deny admission to would-be immigrants had been 
consigned exclusively to the “political departments” of the federal 
government.23 It therefore lay beyond “the province of the 
judiciary” to order “that foreigners who have never been 
naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the 
United States . . . shall be permitted to enter.”24 At least with 
respect to non-resident foreigners, “the decisions of executive or 
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by 
Congress, are due process of law.”25 
Four years later, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States,26 the Court 
extended this principle to the expulsion of resident aliens. At issue 
was a provision of the Geary Act of 1892, authorizing the arrest and 
deportation of any Chinese laborer legally present within the 
United States who failed either to obtain a special “certificate of 
residence” or, in the alternative, to produce a “credible white 
witness” to attest that the laborer had been a resident of the United 
States before the adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.27 
A majority of six justices upheld the certificate requirement.28 “The 
right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely 
or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace,” the Court declared, 
was “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and 
independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its 
welfare.”29 Accordingly, the constitutional right of due process, 
“the right of trial by jury, and prohibiting unreasonable searches 
 
23. Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659. 
24. Id. at 660. 
25. Id. The Court did create a narrow opening for procedural review a 
decade later when it indicated that administrative officers could not “disregard 
the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law.’” Kaoru 
Yamataya v. Fisher (Japanese Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86, 100 (1903). 
Although noncitizens’ procedural challenges virtually always failed, the 
Japanese Immigrant Case did establish a formal doctrinal foothold for 
procedural due process claims that subsequently afforded meaningful, if still 
highly deferential, judicial review. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 
(1982) (holding that a returning alien was entitled to due process in her 
exclusion hearing). 
26. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
27. See id. at 727. The “credible white witness” alternative to the 
certificate of residence was introduced in a rule issued by the Secretary of the 
Treasury, who was charged with enforcing the certificate requirement. See id. 
at 726–27. 
28. See id. at 732. 
29. Id. at 711. 
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and seizures, and cruel and unusual punishments, have no 
application.”30 Three justices, including Stephen Field, lodged 
vigorous dissents.31 
Of course, neither nativism nor political movements to restrict 
immigration   were   unique   to   the   late   nineteenth  century.32 
 
30. Id. at 730. The Court has continued to insist on the essentially “civil” 
nature of deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been 
consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”); I.N.S. v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“Consistent with the civil nature 
of the proceedings, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal 
trial do not apply in a deportation hearing.”). 
31. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 
(Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). Both Field and 
Justice David Brewer objected that, as persons residing lawfully within the 
United States, the petitioners were entitled to the protection of the 
Constitution, and that the registration requirement imposed punishment 
without due process of law. See id. at 733 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 759 
(Field, J., dissenting). Field’s dissent hinged on what he called the “wide and 
essential difference” between “legislation for the exclusion of Chinese  
persons . . . and legislation for the deportation of those who have acquired a 
residence.” Id. at 746. But the author of the Chinese Exclusion Case also made 
a point to attack what he viewed as the majority’s improper conflation of alien 
friends with alien enemies. See id. at 748. “Aliens from countries at peace 
with us,” he explained, “domiciled within our country by its consent, are 
entitled to all the guarantees for the protection of their persons and property 
which are secured to native-born citizens.” Id. at 754. Justice Brewer went 
further, delivering a biting condemnation of the very notion of unrestricted, 
extra-constitutional authority: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both indefinite 
and dangerous. Where are the limits to such powers to be found[?] . . . 
Is it within legislative capacity to declare the limits? If so, then the 
mere assertion of an inherent power creates it, and despotism exists. 
May the courts establish the boundaries? Whence do they obtain the 
authority for this? . . . The expulsion of a race may be within the 
inherent powers of a despotism. 
Id. at 737 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
32. Policymakers and charity administrators had long decried European 
governments’ alleged “dumping” of their poor into the United States, and 
regulators from immigrant-receiving seaboard states acted aggressively to 
protect their citizens from the burden of supporting “foreign paupers.”  Kunal 
M. Parker, State, Citizenship and Territory: The Legal Construction of 
Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 583, 601 (2001); 
Hidetaka Hirota, The Moment of Transition: State Officials, the Federal 
Government, and the Formation of American Immigration Policy, 99 J. AM. 
HIST. 1092, 1098–99 (2013). The southern states excluded “negro seamen” and 
other foreign blacks from their territory throughout the antebellum era. 
KUNAL M. PARKER, MAKING FOREIGNERS: IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP LAW IN 
AMERICA, 1600–2000, at 105–07, 117–18 (2015); Anna O. Law, Lunatics, Idiots, 
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Notwithstanding the long-running, regionally variable ebb and flow 
of restrictionist sentiment, however, well into the post-Civil-War 
period federal policy was premised on a broad confidence both in 
the economic value of immigrants’ labor and, particularly for 
Europeans, in their prospects for assimilation.33 So long as 
immigrants were properly diffused throughout the nation, the 
consensus held, the warm bath of economic freedom, abundant 
land, and republican political fellowship would dissolve away the 
residue of Old World oppression, infusing newcomers with economic 
and political independence, habits of strenuous labor, and devotion 
to their adopted nation.34 Throughout this era of relative 
confidence, the individual states (under their police power)35 and 
the federal government (under Congress’ commerce power)36 
governed immigration concurrently, with the balance of authority 
shifting gradually toward the latter. And indeed, until the 1880s, 
neither the immigrant-receiving seaboard states nor the federal 
government inhibited a substantial portion of would-be foreign 
migrants.37 
 
 
Paupers, and Negro Seamen—Immigration Federalism and the Early 
American State, 28 STUD. AM. POL. DVT. 107, 122–24 (2014); Mary Sarah 
Bilder, The Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and 
Articles of Commerce, 61 MO. L. REV. 743, 792–93 (1996). California 
lawmakers sought since the 1850s to bar the entry of additional Chinese 
laborers, and lobbied Congress for a federal exclusion law. CHARLES J. 
MCCLAIN, IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10–25 (1994). Finally, anti- 
European nativists had demanded for decades that Congress defend American 
democracy against foreign corruption by lengthening the period of residency 
required for naturalization. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration, 
Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Foreignness, 45 CONN. L. REV. 743, 764– 
65 (2013). 
33. See Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of 
Foreignness, supra note 32, at 764. 
34. Id. 
35. See id. at 747; see also HIDETAKA HIROTA, EXPELLING THE POOR: 
ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES & THE 19TH-CENTURY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
IMMIGRATION POLICY (2017) (describing state regulation of foreign “paupers”); 
Law, supra note 32 (describing state regulation of the foreign poor, criminals, 
diseased, and disabled); Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without 
Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
1, 33–40 (2013) (describing state regulation of alien property rights). 
36. See Lindsay, Immigration, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of 
Foreignness, supra note 32, at 747. 
37. See id. at 763–86. 
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In the decades following the Civil War, however, this 
confidence in assimilation was shattered by a two-front 
immigration “crisis” that contemporaries variably labeled the 
“coolie trade” (for Chinese laborers) and the crisis of “foreign pauper 
labor” (for Europeans).38 In contrast to the so-called “foreign 
paupers” of the past, whose economic dependency had drawn 
periodic attention from lawmakers, charity administrators, and 
immigration restrictionists, Chinese “coolies” and European 
“pauper laborers” not only labored willfully for a wage; they 
competed in the labor market with a vengeance, corrupting that 
market precisely through an excess of economic competitiveness.39 
Pauper laborers robbed “American” workers of the ability to provide 
their families with a “civilized” standard of living, the critique held, 
and thereby degraded not only the labor market, but also the 
economic “independence” of native workers.40 
The “crisis of pauper labor,” as it was called, appeared 
fundamentally different, and vastly more consequential for 
immigration law and policy, than the various immigration “crises” 
identified by earlier generations of restrictionists.41 If left 
unchecked, contemporaries worried, wage competition between 
American workers and “dependent” foreign laborers would drive a 
wedge through the center of postbellum American political 
economy, decoupling the citizenly virtues so essential to the 
political health of the republic and the economic instrument on 
which the industrial order depended—the wage contract.42 As the 
California Senate declared in 1877, pauper labor had made “[t]he 
vaunted ‘dignity of labor’ . . . a biting sarcasm” and a “burlesque on 
the policy of emancipation.”43 The dangers ascribed to foreign 
migration had fundamentally changed, and could no longer be 
mitigated or managed by restricting access to political 
participation. By jeopardizing the living wage—the essential 
condition of republican independence in the post-Civil War era— 
foreign pauper laborers’ mere presence within the United States 
 
 
38. See id. at 794. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. CAL. SEN. REP. OF ITS SPEC. COMM. ON CHINSE IMMIGRATION, CHINESE 
IMMIGRATION: SOCIAL, MORAL AND POLITICAL EFFECT 6–7 (1878). 
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imperiled the health of American citizenship. 
Contemporaries might have interpreted the “crisis of pauper 
labor” as a referendum on the moral integrity of the industrial wage 
system, and thus advocated reforms designed to address structural 
economic changes, such as the deskilling of labor and increasingly 
intense wage competition. And indeed, labor unionists and their 
allies did just that.44 Beginning in the late 1870s and early 1880s, 
however, legislators, judges, social scientists, and reformers 
increasingly understood a worker’s devotion to maintaining an 
“American” standard of living, and his refusal to labor for a wage 
that could not sustain that standard, as a critical measure of 
economic and moral fitness. Accordingly, they diagnosed eroding 
standards of living among wage workers less as a fundamental 
political-economic problem rooted in the industrial labor system, 
than as evidence of the dubious worthiness of foreign laborers 
themselves. With remarkable consistency, moreover, they cast 
such unworthiness in terms of unskilled laborers’ fundamental, 
indelible foreignness, often rendered in the increasingly resonant 
language of race. The trope of foreignness thus described not only 
the absence of formal citizenship, but a deeper, more elemental 
estrangement from the defining political-economic values of post- 
Civil War republican civilization. European and Chinese laborers’ 
pathological underconsumption—their willingness to work for 
starvation wages; their apparent contentment to live in 
overcrowded, vermin-infested hovels and to subsist on rotten, 
disease-ridden food—was the product of hereditary dispositions 
ingrained over centuries. 
Through the discourse of indelible foreignness, contemporaries 
re-imagined the American polity as a social and political body 
whose health depended less on the vitality of its political and 
economic institutions than on the collective natural endowments of 
its constituent members. Without the requisite economic 
conditions and racial material, they contended, simply immersing 
foreign laborers in republican political culture afforded little value 
as a force of assimilation. In short, republicans were born, rather 
than made. The future of the republic could thus be preserved only 
by repelling the foreign menace that threatened to degrade it. 
 
44. William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the 
Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 767, 787–88 (1985). 
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In this context, the invasion trope was more than a stock image 
of nativist demagoguery. The passages quoted above from the 
Chinese Exclusion Case convey the flavor of that trope as it applied 
to the Chinese.45 And indeed, cries of racial invasion permeated 
the anti-Chinese crusade as it swept eastward from California in 
the late 1870s and early 1880s, from the speeches and petitions of 
western politicians and labor leaders; to the editorial pages of 
national newspapers and debates in Congress; to the legal 
arguments of the Executive branch; and finally, to the decisions of 
the Supreme Court.46 As the United States Solicitor General 
declared in 1892, it was “generally conceded that the most insidious 
and dangerous enemies to the State are not the armed foes who 
invade our territory, but those alien races who are incapable of 
assimilation, and come among us to debase our labor and poison the 
health and morals of the communities in which they locate.”47 
Lawmakers deployed the same trope of foreign invasion to 
condemn the degradation of American labor and citizenship by the 
foreign pauper laborers of Southern and Eastern Europe. They 
were “the Goths and Vandals of the modern era,” explained a U.S. 
Senator in 1884.48 “They come only to lay waste, to degrade, and 
to destroy. They bring with them ignorance, degraded morals, a 
low standard of civilization, and no motive to intended American 
citizenship.”49 Foreign pauper laborers appeared animated not by 
a desire for independence, or self-improvement, or material 
comfort, but by raw animal instinct. “Like the vast flights of 
grasshoppers and locusts . . . they sweep down upon our fields of 
labor to devour and strip from us the benefit of our customs and of 
the laws protecting American labor, and they take their flight again 
back to the breeding places from which they came.”50 Once again, 
this is not merely colorful hyperbole. The invasion trope and the 
discourse of indelible foreignness infused the era’s highly successful 
immigration restriction campaigns, and underwrote the deeper and 
 
45. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 
46. See, e.g., ANDREW GYORY, CLOSING THE GATE: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE 
CHINESE EXCLUSION ACT 261, 270, 277–78, 281 (1998). 
47. Brief for the Respondents at 55, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698 (1893). 
48. 15 CONG. REC. 5369 (1884) (statement of Sen. Cutcheon). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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more enduring process of noncitizens’ constitutional estrangement. 
Today, more than a century later, federal regulation of 
noncitizens remains constitutionally exceptional, outside of and 
largely insulated from mainstream constitutional norms. Under 
this “plenary power doctrine,” as constitutional immigration law is 
conventionally known, federal authority to regulate immigration 
derives not from any enumerated power, but is rather “an incident 
of sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States.”51 
The authority is thus exclusive to the federal government, and its 
exercise by Congress or the President is buffered against judicially 
enforceable  constitutional  constraints.52 Critically, the Court 
continues to justify the constitutional exceptionalism of 
immigration power with reference to the purportedly intricate 
connection between immigration regulation and “basic aspects of 
national sovereignty, more particularly our foreign relations and 
the national security.”53 
When a noncitizen encounters governmental authority outside 
of the immigration context—for example, as an employee, criminal 
defendant, or business licensee—she enjoys the same slate of 
constitutional protections as a citizen.54 The moment a court 
determines that a federal law or enforcement action qualifies as a 
regulation of immigration per se, however, it triggers a 
constitutionally exceptional authority, the exercise of which lies 
largely beyond the scope of constitutional review.55 This is true 
 
51. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 609 (1889). 
52. This is not to suggest that the plenary power doctrine always wholly 
immunizes immigration-related federal lawmaking from meaningful 
constitutional review. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34–35 (1982) 
(recognizing returning non-citizens’ right to due process in exclusion hearings); 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82–83 (1976) (applying rational basis review to 
federal alienage discrimination). 
53. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). See also Demore v. Kim, 
538 U.S. 510, 522 (2003) (“[A]ny policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately 
interwoven with contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign 
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form of 
government.” (citation omitted)). 
54. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886); see also Wong Wing 
v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 233–34, 238 (1896) (striking down on Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment grounds a federal statute imposing imprisonment at hard 
labor on aliens determined in a summary administrative proceeding to be in 
the country illegally). 
55. See, e.g., Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81. 
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even when the constitutional protection being asserted—for 
example, the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or the 
Equal Protection Clause—makes no distinction between “persons” 
and “citizens.”56 Nor does it matter whether the underlying basis 
for removal bears even a colorable connection to foreign affairs or 
national security—for example, whether the noncitizen in question 
is a suspected terrorist mastermind or a teenage petty criminal. 
The consequences for noncitizens are often profound. Long-term 
legal residents lack robust constitutional protections against often- 
lengthy detention during removal proceedings57 or selection for 
removal based on otherwise constitutionally protected speech or 
associations.58 Noncitizens outside the United States lack a legal 
interest in admission sufficient even to challenge their exclusion; 
and on the few occasions that the Court has reviewed a visa 
denial—always in cases brought by United States citizens—it has 
refused to subject the decision to more than nominal scrutiny.59 
 
56. The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses protect “persons” 
without regard to citizenship. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme 
Court has long acknowledged as much when reviewing state laws 
discriminating on the basis of alienage. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369 
(observing that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment were “universal in their application, to all persons 
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality”). The First Amendment is framed as a general 
restraint on Congress. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The only potentially 
meaningful exception is the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting the states from “abridg[ing] the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States.” Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
57. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 513. 
58. See Reno v. Am. Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491– 
92 (1999). Accordingly, scholars and courts alike have long noted the 
constitutional exceptionalism of federal immigration regulation, decried the 
injustice that it produces, and called for greater constitutional protection for 
noncitizens. See, e.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 196 (2002); DANIEL 
KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 15–20 (2007); 
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW 13 (1996); PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN- 
BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP 19 (1998); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership, and the Constitution, 7 CONST. 
COMMENT. 9, 9–10 (1990); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the 
Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984); 
Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 
1704 (1992). 
59. See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., 
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The Government’s defense of President Trump’s authority to 
issue the current travel ban rests squarely on this well-established 
(if not entirely consistent) judicial posture of broad deference in 
exclusion matters. As the discussion below suggests, both the 
Government and the justices tend to avoid even citing the original 
plenary power decisions, preferring to rely instead on a series of 
staunchly deferential exclusion and deportation cases decided in 
the 1950s, in which international communism rather than racial 
invasion loomed as the foremost threat to national sovereignty and 
security.60 And indeed, over the course of the twentieth century, as 
the overt nativism and racism that animated the Chinese Exclusion 
Case and Fong Yue Ting faded from both federal immigration law 
and respectable political and judicial discourse, the trope of 
immigrant   invasion    likewise   disappeared    from   the  Court’s 
 
 
concurring) (Because the challenged visa denial rested on a “facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason,” the Court should “neither look behind the exercise of 
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the 
constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might implicate.” (internal 
quotations and citation omitted)); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n.5 (1976) 
(The government’s position that “substantive policy regulating the admission 
of aliens . . . [is] not an appropriate subject for judicial review” is at odds with 
“[o]ur cases reflect[ing] acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the 
Constitution even with respect to . . . the admission and exclusion of aliens.”); 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“The power of congress to 
exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the terms and 
conditions upon which they may come to this country, and to have its declared 
policy . . . enforced exclusively through executive officers, without judicial 
intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications.” (quoting Lem Moon 
Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895))); United States ex rel. Knauff 
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized 
by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” 
(citations omitted)). 
60. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531–32 (1954) (upholding 
deportation of long-term legal resident based on past membership in 
Communist Party); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
215–16 (1953) (upholding exclusion and indefinite detention of noncitizen on 
Ellis Island without a hearing); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 591 
(1952) (upholding deportation of long-term legal resident based on past 
membership in Communist Party); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 546–47 (upholding 
exclusion of noncitizen wife of an American citizen, without a hearing and on 
the basis of secret evidence). In fact, the national security cases of the Cold 
War era are notable today for their failure to command anything approaching 
judicial consensus about the metes and bounds of the federal immigration 
power. See Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” 68 FLA. 
L. REV. 179, 219–24 (2016). 
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immigration decisions and the Government’s briefs.61 Of course, 
neither is obliged to acknowledge the overwrought nativism that 
marked the origins of plenary power, and one might even interpret 
the omission of the foundational anti-Chinese cases as a sign of 
“progress.” Yet that omission is also an act of historical forgetting, 
the necessary consequence of which is to obscure the vision of racial 
invasion that nourished and animated the plenary power doctrine 
at its inception. This is particularly relevant when the Government 
claims, as it typically does, that the challenged regulation 
implicates foreign affairs and national security.62 One contention 
of this Article is that President Trump’s unapologetic scapegoating 
of noncitizens has made newly visible the tropes of racial invasion 
and existential threat embedded in the federal immigration power 
more than a century ago—a theme I return to below. 
First, however, consider the extent to which the Government’s 
defense of the travel ban relies on a claim of virtually unfettered, 
constitutionally exceptional authority.63 “‘The exclusion of aliens 
 
 
61. For the past half-century, in particular, federal law governing 
eligibility for admission to the United States has generally reflected the more 
pluralistic, inclusive dimension of the national heritage. The civil rights 
revolution arrived in immigration law in 1965, when Congress finally 
eliminated the seven-decades-long near-total exclusion of immigrants from the 
so-called Asian-Pacific triangle and abandoned a National Origins Quota 
system that had severely restricted immigration from other countries outside 
of western and northern Europe since the 1920s. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. 
No. 89-236, sec. 1, § 201(e), sec. 2, § 201(a)–(b), 79 Stat. 911–912; see generally 
Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A 
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 
(1996). 
62. It likewise suppresses consideration of why a body of federal law that 
is overwhelmingly concerned with ordinary matters of labor, crime, and access 
to public services, should be “conclusive upon the judiciary”—that is, why a 
regulatory domain dominated by patently unexceptional subject matter has 
been consigned to the “political branches,” where the government’s conduct is 
buffered against constitutional review. See Lindsay, Disaggregating 
“Immigration Law,” supra note 61. 
63. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari 
for the challenge to EO-3, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923, 923 (2018), but the 
Government has not yet submitted its brief on the merits. The following 
discussion thus relies on the Government’s August 2017 Brief to the Court 
defending EO-2, and the Government’s Petition for Certiorari in the current 
challenge to EO-3. See Brief for the Petitioners, Trump v. Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (Nos. 16-1436 and 16-1540) (filed Aug. 10, 
2017); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (No. 17-965) (filed 
Jan. 5, 2018). 
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is a fundamental act of sovereignty’ that the Constitution entrusts 
to the political branches,”64 the Government argues—a sovereign 
right that “stems not alone from the legislative power but is 
inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the 
nation”65 and is “largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”66 The wide breadth of executive judgement and 
discretion is embodied in the “fundamental and longstanding” 
principle of “consular nonreviewability.”67 That principle applies 
“regardless of the manner in which the Executive decides to deny 
entry to an alien abroad”68 and, the Government argues, buffers 
President Trump’s Proclamation against judicial review, making 
the challengers’ statutory claims nonjusticiable and their 
Establishment Clause claim subject only to “minimal scrutiny.”69 
I focus here on the Government’s constitutional arguments, 
because that is where President Trump’s unabashed nativist 
demagoguery may bear most directly on the justices’ willingness to 
scrutinize the Proclamation’s asserted rationale.70 The 
 
64. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, at 23 (quoting Knauff, 338 
U.S. at 542). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)); see 
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 64, at 27. 
67. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, at 24. 
68. Id. at 25. 
69. See id. 
70. With respect to the nonjusticiability of the challengers’ statutory 
claims, the Government insists that “the denial or revocation of a visa for an 
alien abroad ‘is not subject to judicial review’” absent “affirmative 
authorization” by Congress. Id. at 24. This presumption of nonreviewability, 
and of the President’s wide latitude in questions of exclusion more generally, 
also directly inform the Government’s argument that § 1182(f) of the INA, 
authorizing the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of 
aliens” whose entry he “finds . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), confers a “sweeping proclamation power” 
that the President may wield unfettered either by the Establishment Clause 
or the INA’s prohibition against nationality-based discrimination in the 
issuance of visas. See id. at 40. Section 1152(a)(1)(A) of the INA provides: 
“[N]o person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated 
against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of the person’s race, sex, 
nationality, place of birth, or place or residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1152. Congress 
added that nondiscrimination provision in the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965—thirteen years after the adoption of § 1182(f) in the Immigration 
and Nationality Act of 1952.  Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 2, 
§ 201(a), 79 Stat. 9112. “Congress placed no restrictions on which ‘interests’ 
count or what ‘detriment[s]’ suffice for the President to invoke his suspension 
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Government and the challengers agree with both the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal that, under established precedent, 
a court will uphold an exclusion order against constitutional 
challenge so long as the Government provides a “facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason.”71 That is a very low bar; just how low, 
however, is a critical subject of dispute. The Court’s last word on 
the issue, the 2015 case of Kerry v. Din, sheds the most light on the 
disputed meaning of that phrase, and thus on the current justices’ 
disposition toward presidential claims of unfettered discretion to 
exclude noncitizens.72 In Din, a five-justice majority rejected 
United States citizen Fauzia Din’s due process challenge to the 
exclusion of her noncitizen husband, Kanishka Berashk, on 
unspecified “national security” grounds.73 The opinion for the 
Court, which represented the views of only three justices, endorsed 
the Government’s claim of “consular absolutism”—the notion that 
there is no right to judicial review of a rejected visa application, 
even when the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen.74 Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, rejected consular absolutism and concluded 
that the Government’s bare citation to the statutory provision 
under which Berashk was excluded, while refusing to reveal the 
specific factual basis for the denial, did not constitute due process 
of law.75 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, which was joined 
 
authority, committing all of those matters to the President’s judgment and 
discretion,” the Government argues. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 64, 
at 41. Judicial deference is “especially warranted,” moreover, because a 
President’s determinations to “suspend the entry of aliens . . . directly 
implicate his foreign-affairs and national-security powers”—a domain of 
presidential authority in which courts are “utterly unable to assess” the 
“adequacy” and “authenticity” of his reasons. Id. at 42. In short, the 
President’s judgment with respect to the exclusion of noncitizens is “not subject 
to review.” Id. at 42. 
71. Id. at 62. 
72. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015). Eight of the nine current justices participated 
in Din. Justice Gorsuch had not yet joined the Court. 
73. Id. at 2141. 
74. The opinion for the Court was written by Justice Scalia, who has since 
been succeeded by Justice Gorsuch, and joined by Justice Thomas and Chief 
Justice Roberts. Id. at 2131. 
75. Justice Breyer’s dissent upholds a long tradition of vigorous judicial 
protest against the Court’s reflexive deference in immigration matters. See 
Lindsay, Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” supra note 61, at 215–24. That 
history  began  with Justice  Field and  Brewer’s  withering  condemnation   
in Fong Yue Ting v. United States of the “indefinite and dangerous” doctrine of 
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by Justice Alito, provided the fourth and fifth votes upholding the 
exclusion, and was therefore controlling.76 Kennedy, like the four 
dissenters, rejected consular absolutism, but nevertheless 
concluded that merely by citing the INA’s so-called “terrorism 
bar”—a complex provision containing dozens of distinct reasons for 
denying a visa application77—the Government had provided a 
facially legitimate bona fide reason for Berashk’s exclusion, and 
thereby satisfied the requirement of due process.78 
Justice Kennedy’s position in Kerry v. Din—his 
acknowledgement that a U.S. citizen-petitioner can have a 
judicially reviewable constitutional interest in the exclusion of a 
noncitizen, paired with a highly deferential posture toward the 
Government’s asserted reason for that exclusion79—suggests that, 
of all the members of the Din majority who remain on the Court, he 
is perhaps most primed for edification regarding the newly manifest 
perils of perfunctory judicial review in exclusion cases. At first 
blush, it is difficult to conceive how Kennedy, who has a deserved 
reputation  as  a  defender  of  constitutional  liberty,  could  have 
 
 
“powers inherent in sovereignty.” 149 U.S. 698, 737 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). It continued with Justice Douglas and Black’s powerful dissents 
in Cold War-era cases such as United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U.S. 537, 550–52 (1950) (Jackson, J., dissenting) and Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 217–18 (1953) (Black, J., dissenting). 
In Mezei, Black compared the Attorney General’s “unreviewable discretion” 
under the plenary power doctrine with the arbitrary ruthlessness of twentieth- 
century Europe’s most infamous authoritarians. See id. This sentiment 
endures in modern opinions such as Justice Souter’s forceful four-justice 
dissent in Demore v. Kim, insisting that “the basic liberty from physical 
confinement at the heart of due process” demands that the government prove 
a “sufficiently compelling” reason before it can “lock away” a removable 
noncitizen. 538 U.S. 510, 541, 549, 551 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Although Justice Breyer’s dissent in Kerry v. Din is more restrained in both 
tone and substance, his insistence that the denial of a noncitizen’s visa 
application interferes with a constitutional liberty interest (albeit that of the 
noncitizen applicant’s American spouse, rather than the noncitizen himself), 
and that such interference warrants “individualized adjudication,” including 
the “ordinary application of Due Process Clause procedures,” resonates with 
longstanding pleas both on and off the court to end to immigration law’s 
century-long constitutional exile. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2144 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
76. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (2012). 
78. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
79. Id. 
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concluded in good faith that merely gesturing to a wide-ranging 
statutory assortment of possible reasons for denying a visa 
application provides meaningful protection against arbitrary or 
otherwise improper governmental conduct—the essence of 
constitutional due process. And indeed, in virtually any context 
other than immigration, such judicial “review” would appear little 
more than an empty gesture to the rule of law. Viewed in the 
context of the Court’s immigration jurisprudence, however, 
Kennedy’s position becomes, if not persuasive, at least intelligible. 
Like the Government’s argument in Trump v. Hawaii,80 Kennedy’s 
concurrence in Din81 relies heavily on the 1972 case Kleindienst v. 
Mandel.82 There, the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the Government’s exclusion of Ernest Mandel, a 
Belgian journalist, scholar, and self-described “revolutionary 
Marxist,”83 on the ground that, during a previous visit to the United 
States, Mandel had failed to “conform to his itinerary and limit his 
activities to the stated purposes of his trip.”84 The Court 
acknowledged that Mandel’s exclusion implicated the petitioners’ 
(American scholars who had invited Mandel to an academic 
conference in the United States) First Amendment right to hear 
him speak, but declined to approach the Government’s proffered 
reason skeptically, and to inquire whether it was mere pretext for 
the real reason for Mandel’s exclusion—namely, disapproval of his 
ideas.85 
As far as Justice Kennedy was concerned, the “reasoning and 
holding in Mandel control[ed]” in Din.86 So long as a visa denial 
that burdened the constitutional interest of a U.S. citizen rested on 
a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason,” Kennedy wrote, quoting 
from Mandel, “‘courts will neither look behind the exercise of that 
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against’ the 
constitutional interests of citizens the visa denial might 
implicate”—an act of judicial deference that had “particular force in 
the area of national security.”87 “Given Congress’ plenary power to 
 
80. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 64, at 18. 
81. 135 S. Ct. at 2139–41 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
82. 408 U.S. 753 (1972). 
83. Id. at 756. 
84. Id. at 758. 
85. Id. at 768–69. 
86. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770). 
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‘suppl[y] the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United 
States,’” he reasoned, “it follows that the Government’s decision to 
exclude an alien it determines does not satisfy one or more of those 
conditions is facially legitimate under Mandel.”88 
Yet Kennedy must have realized that to sanction the opacity of 
the Government’s decision to exclude Berashk even while 
acknowledging Din’s constitutional interest in the integrity of that 
decision requires more than a straightforward application of 
Mandel. Notwithstanding the Mandel Court’s forthright 
affirmation of the plenary power doctrine and its refusal to “look 
behind” the Government’s asserted reason for Mandel’s exclusion,89 
the Government had in fact provided the citizen-petitioners in that 
case with substantially more “process” than Kennedy requires in 
Din.90 Critically, the Government had informed Mandel of the 
concrete facts that purportedly led to his visa denial—specifically, 
his failure to comply with the “conditions and limitations attached 
to his [prior] visa issuance.”91 Kennedy evades this critical 
distinction by pointing to the “discrete factual predicates” 
enumerated in the statute under which Berashk’s visa application 
was denied.92 This is a slight-of-hand that evacuates the right to 
due process of anything resembling individualized consideration. 
In this respect, Kennedy’s opinion more closely resembles the 
Court’s pre-Warren-era exclusion decisions, which all but 
acknowledged that constitutional due process in immigration 
proceedings was an empty shell.93 In short, Kennedy assumes that 
 
88. Id. at 2140 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
U.S. 537, 542, 543 (1950)). 
89. See Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770. 
90. 135 S. Ct. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
91. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 758–59. 
92. Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2140 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
93. Consider Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immigrant Case), which 
is generally credited with creating a narrow opening for procedural review 
(which the Chinese Exclusion Case and Fong Yue Ting had appeared to bar). 
189 U.S. 86 (1903). Notwithstanding the political departments’ broad 
authority to exclude or expel aliens, the Court reasoned, administrative officers 
“may [not] disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in due process of 
law.” Id. at 100. While such language may appear to stake out for the Court  
a  meaningful  role  in  insuring  procedural  fairness,  the  actual  outcome   
of Yamataya tells a very different story. Yamataya, a Japanese woman, had 
been excluded from the United States based on a federal immigration 
inspector’s finding that she was “likely to become a public charge.” Id. at 87. 
Yamataya appealed, claiming that she had not been afforded a meaningful 
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Din held a protected liberty interest in the Government’s 
consideration of her husband’s visa application, yet denies that that 
interest entitled either her or Berashk to any information that 
would enable them to comprehend, let alone challenge, the reasons 
for his exclusion.94 
What, if anything, does Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion 
in Din suggest about his disposition in Trump v. Hawaii? Once one 
grants, as Kennedy did in Din, that the Government’s exclusion of 
a noncitizen can impair the constitutional rights of citizens and 
legal residents, such extraordinary deference is comprehensible 
only where there is no obvious reason to doubt that the Government 
has acted in good faith. And then came Donald Trump. For the 
past two years, Donald Trump—first as a candidate, then as 
President—has offered spectacular proof that the invasion 
metaphor continues to resonate with many Americans.95 He 
announced his candidacy with lurid images Mexican drug dealers 
and rapists pouring into the country96—a problem that could only 
 
 
opportunity to challenge the inspector’s decision. The Court acknowledged 
that the petitioner lacked “knowledge of our language; that she did not 
understand the nature and import of the questions propounded to her; that the 
investigation made was a ‘pretended’ one; and that she did not, at the time, 
know that the investigation had reference to her being deported from the 
country,” but nevertheless concluded that such personal “misfortune . . . 
constitutes no reason . . . under any rule of law, for the intervention of the 
court.” Id. at 101–02. Or consider Knauff, in which the Court upheld the 
exclusion of Ellen Knauff, the German wife of an American citizen, without a 
hearing and on the basis of secret evidence. 338 U.S. 537, 539, 547 (1950). 
“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,” the Court famously 
declared, “it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” Id. at 
544 (citations omitted). Knauff presented such a sympathetic figure, and her 
plight was considered such a travesty of justice, that the Attorney General 
(after considerable prodding from Congress) eventually granted her a full 
exclusion hearing. That hearing ultimately resulted in her admission to the 
United States as a permanent resident after it was determined that her 
exclusion as a national security risk had been based on “unsubstantiated 
hearsay.” Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: 
Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 
933, 958–64 (1995). 
94. See Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
95. Both the challengers and the Fourth Circuit detail this history at 
length in support of their Establishment Clause analyses. See Int’l Refugee 
Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 594–600 (4th Cir. 2017); Brief in 
Opposition at 2–8, Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 
(2017) (No. 16-1436). 
96. Donald Trump stated: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not 
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be solved, he insisted, by constructing a “great wall on our southern 
border.”97 Then came the flood of Islamic terrorists posing as 
refugees of the Syrian civil war. His solution? A “total and 
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”98 Nor 
was this simply election-season hyperbole uttered spontaneously 
during the fervor of a campaign rally, but rather a considered 
position set forth in a formal “Statement on Preventing Muslim 
Immigration” that was featured on Trump’s campaign website for 
a year-and-a-half, including during the first five months of his 
presidency.99 In short, Trump promised voters that he alone could 
repel the invasion of the United States by foreign terrorists and 
other criminals, and they responded. Then, all of seven days into 
his presidency, he made good on his promise by issuing the first of 
three successive orders banning migrants from several 
predominantly Muslim countries from entering the United 
States.100 That order was soon replaced by a second,101 and then, 
nearly six months later, by the third and current iteration,102 which 
indefinitely prohibits travel to the United States by citizens of six 
majority-Muslim countries (Chad, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and 
 
 
sending their best. They’re not sending you . . . . They’re sending people that 
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.” Full Text: Donald 
Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text- 
donald-trump-announces-a-presedential-bid/?utm_term=.2clab2c28407. 
97. Id. 
98. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for “total and complete shutdown of 
Muslims entering the United States,” WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), 
https://washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump- 
calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-entering-the-united- 
states/?utm_terms=.bfbf614a81fb (quoting Trump Campaign press release). 
99. “Statement on Preventing Muslim Immigration” was posted on 
Trump’s website on December 7, 2015. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 
F.3d at 594. Notably, the Statement was taken down in early May 2018, five 
months after Trump’s inauguration as President and shortly before oral 
argument before the Fourth Circuit on EO-2. Brief in Opposition, supra note 
96, at 25 n.15. 
100. Exec. Order No. 13769, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977, 8978 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
101. Exec. Order No. 13780, Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist 
Entry into United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 13202 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
102. Proclamation No. 9645, Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes 
for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other 
Public-Safety Threats, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
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Yemen) and North Korea.103 
Both the challengers and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits grant 
that the Government possesses plenary federal power to exclude 
noncitizens, but insist that such power “is not tantamount to a 
Constitutional blank check.”104 Even Mandel and Din do not 
“completely insulate [exclusion] decisions from any meaningful 
review.”105 Rather, the “bona fide” requirement106 conditions the 
“longstanding principle of deference to the political branches”107 on 
the Government’s “good faith.”108 As the Fourth Circuit explains, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Din established “that where a 
plaintiff makes ‘an affirmative showing of bad faith’ that is 
‘plausibly alleged with sufficient particularity,’ courts may ‘look 
behind’ the challenged action to assess its ‘facially legitimate’ 
justification.”109 Accordingly, the court reads Kennedy’s opinion 
not as an injunction against judicial scrutiny, but rather “to require 
that we step away from our deferential posture and look behind the 
stated reason for the challenged action.”110 Once authorized to 
“look behind” the national security rationale set forth in the 
Proclamation, to candidate and President Trump’s extensive record 
of anti-Muslim statements (including his candid characterizations 
of the first travel ban as a “Muslim ban”111) the Fourth Circuit had 
little difficulty concluding that EO-2’s “stated national security 
interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for its [anti-Muslim] 
purpose.”112 Justice Kennedy may well find that analysis 
persuasive. After all, if, as the Government maintains, the 
abundant, highly public evidence of President Trump’s anti-Muslim 
 
103. Id. at 45165–67. 
104. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590; see Hawaii v. Trump, 
878 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2017); Brief in Opposition, supra note 96, at 46. 
105. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590; see also Hawaii, 878 
F.3d at 679 (“Although the political branches’ power to exclude aliens is ‘largely 
immune from judicial control,’ it is not entirely immune . . . . Moreover, this 
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108. Id. at 590–91 (citing Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2141 (2015) 
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demagoguery counts for nothing, it is difficult to view the 
circumscribed judicial “review” that Kennedy endorsed in Din as 
anything but an empty formalism. If he is prepared to affirm that 
it is not an empty formalism, and to inquire whether the 
Government’s “facially neutral” reason for banning 150 million 
people from entering the United States is mere pretext for religious 
discrimination, it is entirely possible to strike down the travel ban 
on constitutional grounds without dismantling the plenary power 
doctrine. 
I want to propose, however, that when we view President 
Trump’s nativist bombast in light of the 120-year history of 
constitutional exceptionalism in immigration matters, it suggests 
still more far-reaching implications. As this Article explained 
above, in the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court translated 
the political trope of indelible foreignness into a potent and durable 
rationale for extra-constitutional authority, forging the 
immigration power into an instrument of national “self- 
preservation” to be deployed against invading armies of racially 
degraded, economically and politically unassimilable foreigners.113 
Even today, generations after the United States abandoned 
Chinese exclusion and national origins quotas, immigrants’ 
constitutional estrangement—the principle that foreignness per se 
rightly dictates the nature of the authority to which they are 
subject—remains an axiomatic feature of the federal immigration 
power. For modern judicial and scholarly defenders of immigration 
exceptionalism, the indecorous rhetoric that clutters the historical 
origins of the plenary power doctrine does not diminish its legal 
soundness and continued legitimacy. Once we strip away the 
Court’s racism and the overwrought metaphor of alien invasion, the 
argument runs, the Government’s inherent power to control the 
admission and expulsion of non-citizens remains, as a logical 
concomitant of national sovereignty. After all, outside of the 
Naturalization Clause the Constitution is silent on the federal 
government’s power to regulate immigration; but such authority 
must exist somewhere.114 
113. See supra notes 12–31 and accompanying text. 
114. It bears noting that even if one concedes that the principle of 
territorial sovereignty implies an authority to govern the rights of noncitizens 
to enter into and remain within territory, it does not follow that such authority 
must be exercised beyond the reach of mainstream constitutional norms, and 
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Yet as I have argued, the invasion trope was not merely 
anachronistic dicta; rather, it enabled the Court to bridge the 
gaping chasm between its novel legal rationale for federal authority 
and the decidedly quotidian purpose and subject matter of most 
immigration   lawmaking  and  enforcement.  It was precisely 
immigrants’  fundamental,  indelible foreignness—their  racial 
difference, their inability to assimilate, their destructive effect on 
American citizenship—that gave substance to the metaphor of 
racial invasion, and thus to the analogy between immigration 
regulation and war. Indeed, the tropes of invasion and war conjure 
Congress’s Article I authority to “repel [i]nvasions”115 and “declare 
[w]ar”116 without strictly invoking them, and thereby also summon 
the tradition of judicial deference toward those archetypal 
“political” powers. The Court’s declared objective of national self- 
preservation against invading foreign races cannot, therefore, be 
swept aside like some unseemly rhetorical debris from a bygone era, 
cluttering the  logically sound  foundation  of immigration 
exceptionalism.    Rather, President Trump’s  nativist 
demagoguery—his disarmingly  unapologetic  scapegoating of 
unauthorized  migrants,  refugees,  and  many would-be 
immigrants—makes newly visible plenary power’s long-obscured 
premises. President Trump reminds us, in short, that the trope of 
alien invasion remains the cornerstone of the entire legal edifice.117 
As apprehensive as many of us are about the Court’s review this 
spring of the President’s Proclamation, the case does offer the 
justices a rare opportunity to consider the plenary power doctrine 
in its most honest, unvarnished form. Might the bizarre tableau of 
the travel ban, especially the President’s remarkable public 
statements referring to it as a “Muslim ban,” and cynically 
acknowledging that its ostensible focus on nations rather than 
religion is a fig leaf, cause them to think more critically than they 
have in the past about the Government’s rote invocation of national 
security? One can hope. 
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